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Preface
In this new public policy brief, Greg Hannsgen and I look at two
key laws enacted during a time that has been on many Americans’
minds lately. In the first 100 days of his administration, President
Franklin Roosevelt, facing the worst economic crisis of the 20th
century, sent several important pieces of legislation to Congress.
Among them was the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)
of 1933, which Roosevelt called “the most important and far-
reaching legislation ever enacted by the American Congress”
(quoted in Hawley 1966, 19). On the one hand, the Act called for
industry codes that ultimately had the effect of stifling competi-
tion in many product markets, through measures that included
minimum prices. On the other hand, the path-breaking union
rights and labor protections mandated by the law were not well
enforced. Labor prospered to a much greater extent after the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted in 1935, dur-
ing Roosevelt’s “second 100 days.” This law revived many of the
labor rights guaranteed in the earlier act—which by then had
been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court—and was
enforced more rigorously.
The issues of that period were again brought to the fore by
two recent developments, one cultural and one political. First, in
2007, Amity Shlaes’s The Forgotten Man became a best seller. This
book argues that many New Deal laws, including NIRA and
NLRA, “helped to make the Depression Great” (Shlaes 2007, 8).
Second, President Obama’s election in 2008 stoked hopes for a
strong governmental response to the current recession and finan-
cial crisis, a response that might be patterned after the New Deal.  
These events have in turn sparked a renewed and vigorous
public debate among scholars about the economic impact of the
New Deal, in particular, NIRA and NLRA. A number of econo-
mists have joined this debate, citing research conducted during
the past 15 years. This brief focuses on The Forgotten Man and a
2004 paper by Harold Cole, now at the University of Pennsylvania,
and Lee Ohanian of the University of California, Los Angeles.
The article’s thesis is that NIRA and NLRA hindered recovery
from the Depression after 1933, in part by allowing companies to
conspire to reduce output and raise prices. Also, Cole and
Ohanian argue that NIRA and NLRA reduced employment by
raising wages. 
This brief points out some facts that cast into doubt the way
Cole and Ohanian measure the effects of the two laws. First, car-
tels, monopolies, and industries controlled by a few powerful
firms were common long before the New Deal, and many of
these would have survived throughout the 1930s even without
NIRA. Second, industry generally flouted NIRA’s labor provisions,
using time-honored but illegal methods to quash union activities.
The wage and hours codes were usually drafted by boards with no
labor representation. NLRA was a far more effective piece of leg-
islation, but coming as late as it did, that bill probably had only
a minor effect on overall macroeconomic performance during
the 1930s. Moreover, economists have found evidence that good
unions can accomplish more than raising their members’ wages,
to the benefit of the wider economy. 
The thrust of our analysis is that NIRA and NLRA did not
prolong or worsen the Great Depression. Fiscal policy and jobs
programs had a much greater impact on economic growth in the
1930s, as Keynesian economics has long taught. This impact was
positive and significant. Of course, unemployment remained
high, if only because the federal government did not hire every-
one willing and able to work. For all practical purposes, that did
not happen until after the war effort began. Hence, it is the pub-
lic works and relief programs of the New Deal that offer the most
relevant lessons for legislative efforts to end the current reces-
sion and probable employment slump, though we agree with
Cole and Ohanian that vigorous antitrust enforcement is bene-
ficial to consumers and the economy. 
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
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Introduction
As recently as 1980, Michael M. Weinstein stated that “Most of
those who have considered the macroeconomic impacts of the
[National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933] codes have
either dismissed their importance or considered them to have
been weakly salutary” (Weinstein, 267). NIRA called for indus-
try codes that would ban child labor, end some forms of unfair
business competition, limit the length of the workweek, make it
easier for unions to organize workplaces, and regulate wages and
prices. NIRA was followed by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) of 1935, otherwise known as the Wagner Act, which put
the right to organize on a firmer footing. But in the 25 years fol-
lowing World War II, when various types of Keynesian econom-
ics held sway, most economists and policymakers believed that
these laws, when compared to fiscal and monetary policies, had
little to do with the speed of the recovery from the Depression. 
This view is now being challenged by a wave of revisionist
work claiming to show that NIRA and NLRA slowed the recovery
from the Depression in the period from 1933 to 1939. Amity Shlaes,
in her controversial work The Forgotten Man (2007, 8),writes that
rules written under NIRA “were so stringent they perversely hurt
businesses. They frightened away capital, and they discouraged
employers from hiring workers.” Also, Shlaes blames continuing
high unemployment in the mid and late 1930s partly on strikes that
were made possible by NLRA (9). After citing a number of other
supposedly harmful programs, Shlaes concludes that “government
intervention helped to make the Depression Great” (9), a claim that
she repeated in Time and Forbes earlier this year (2009a, 2009b). 
Economists have also weighed in with academic articles on
the deleterious effects of anticompetitive New Deal legislation
on the speed of the recovery (Cole and Ohanian 1999; Prescott
1999; Bordo, Erceg, and Evans 2000; Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
2002; Cole and Ohanian 2004). One of these economists, Lee
Ohanian, has argued, again in Forbes, that “the Depression lasted
far longer than it should have,” and that “government policies
that restricted competition” such as NIRA and NLRA appear to
be the “main culprit” (Ohanian 2009c, 1; Ohanian 2009a). Eric
Rauchway (2008b) and Benjamin Friedman (2007) have argued
in defense of NIRA, NLRA, and the rest of the New Deal in arti-
cles in the American Prospect and the New York Review of Books.
Many of these arguments have recently echoed in hearings
held by the Economic Policy Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Romer
2009; Galbraith 2009; DeLong 2009b; Winkler 2009; Ohanian
2009b). In March, NIRA and NLRA came under fire at a sym-
posium on the Depression and the New Deal at the Council on
Foreign Relations in New York City (CFR 2009). Even at a Hyde
Park museum exhibit in honor of the 75th anniversary of the
“first 100 days” of Roosevelt’s presidency, the revisionists’ theo-
ries about NIRA were mentioned.  
These debates have continuing political relevance. It is likely
that the recession (or at least an extremely weak job market) will
wear on for some time, and many in Washington are pondering
a second stimulus bill. No one is proposing legislation similar to
the parts of NIRA that enabled industries to form cartels, but the
Employee Free Choice Act, an important prolabor bill in the
spirit of both NLRA and section 7(a) of NIRA, is being drafted.
As a result of the new New Deal fracas, lawmakers and others
will have the New Deal revisionists’ theories at the backs of their
minds as they consider these proposals and others to help bring
about recovery and lasting reform. The objective here is to counter
Shlaes’s and Cole and Ohanian’s claim that NIRA and NLRA
were an important drag on economic performance from 1933
until 1939. A vindication of these laws—even one that acknowl-
edges deep flaws—would help buttress the reputation of gov-
ernment intervention in the economy at a time when lawmakers
should be turning to the New Deal as a model for a new econ-
omy. If Roosevelt is absolved of blame for the severity of the
Depression and given proper credit for his accomplishments, some
lawmakers will be deprived of a dubious excuse for inaction. 
The Purpose of NIRA
When he sent the recovery bill to Congress, Roosevelt stated its
goals: “to obtain wide re-employment, to shorten the workweek,
to pay a decent wage for the shorter week, and to prevent unfair
competition and disastrous overproduction” (quoted in Roos
1971, 41). The bill included some public works projects, but crit-
ics have focused on Title I, which provided for the drafting of
industrial codes. The president was authorized to “approve codes
drawn up by trade or industrial groups providing that he found
such codes to be equitable, truly representative, and not designed
to promote monopolies or monopolistic practices. He might also
make any necessary additions or deletions; and in an industryThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
where no agreement could be reached, he might impose a code”
(Hawley 1966, 31–32). Hawley explains that the bill 
said little about the type of provisions that should be
included in the codes. The only specific instructions, in fact,
were those dealing with labor standards.  Each code, accord-
ing to section 7, had to contain an acceptable provision for
maximum hours, minimum wages, and desirable working
conditions. In addition, it had to include a prescribed sec-
tion 7a, which outlawed yellow dog contracts [which forbid
workers who sign them from joining unions]and guaranteed
the right of laborers to organize and bargain collectively
though representatives of their own choosing. Aside from
these labor clauses, the only other guide was the declaration
of policy contained in Section 1, a declaration that was
couched in terms of broad, general goals rather than spe-
cific instructions. The act, it stated, was designed to promote
cooperative action, eliminate unfair practices, increase pur-
chasing power, expand production, reduce unemployment,
and conserve natural resources; but there was little to indi-
cate the type of code provisions that might be used to achieve
these laudable objectives. (32)
The critics of NIRA have found fault with the law because
it had the effect of allowing firms to work together to set prices,
which, according to economic theory, would result in lower out-
put. This belief might seem unjustified in light of the fact that the
law prohibited codes that allowed collusion, but another clause
exempted the new codes from the antitrust laws, one of numer-
ous contradictory parts (Bellush 1975, 29). Many historians and
economists believe that in practice the bill increased the monop-
oly power of large firms. The New Deal critics also fault NIRA’s
minimum wage and collective bargaining provisions, on the
grounds that they increased wages above competitive levels,
reducing employment.
A look at the economic thought of the time may explain
what led politicians, in the midst of the Depression, to support
measures that most economists now regard as antigrowth. First,
at the time, many economists and others believed that the
Depression’s root cause was overproduction (Wolfskill 1969, 62–
63; Weinstein 1980, 3). As the quote at the beginning of this sec-
tion suggests, Roosevelt was also concerned about overproduction
at the time the bill was sent to Congress. As many policymakers
of the time saw it, the modern economy produced more goods
than consumers were able to purchase, leading to “cutthroat
competition.” As a result, prices were falling, and firms were dras-
tically cutting wages and payrolls in an effort to stay in business.
The new codes would deal with this situation by preventing sales
at below cost, and other unfair trade practices (Wolfskill 1969, 62–
63; Weinstein 1980, 3). Some businessmen and trade associations
foresaw an opportunity to set explicit limits on output. Also, the
bill would shorten the workweek so as to spread work hours
among more workers and boost the purchasing power of workers
by raising wages. While NIRA was designed to speed recovery (as
its title suggests), the portion of the bill calling for industrial codes
was not envisioned by supporters mainly as a stimulus to eco-
nomic growth. Moreover, the bill, like many other parts of the
New Deal, was intended to address social issues, such as child
labor and exploitative employment, not just to fight the Depression.
Surely, these, too, are laudable objectives. 
The administration and others also had in mind the idea that
the U.S. economy had reached a “mature” phase in which signifi-
cant, sustained growth was no longer possible, and other policy
objectives became more relevant (Wolfskill 1969, 62–63). This view
led Roosevelt in 1932 to describe the role of government in a
depressed economy much differently than modern economists:
Clearly, all this calls for a re-appraisal of values. A mere builder
of more industrial plants, a creator of more railroad systems,
an organizer of more corporations, is as likely to be a danger
as a help…. Our task is not discovery, or exploitation of nat-
ural resources, or necessarily producing more goods. It is the
soberer, less dramatic business of administering resources and
plants already in hand, of seeking to reestablish foreign mar-
kets for our surplus production, of meeting the problem of
under consumption, of adjusting production to consump-
tion, of distributing wealth and products more equitably, of
adapting existing economic organizations to the service of the
people. (Roosevelt, quoted in Kennedy 1999, 373)
Were NIRA and NLRA to Blame?
The economists who regard NIRA and NLRA as significant hin-
drances to recovery have a much different view of the perform-
ance of an unfettered capitalist economy. Edward Prescott, for
example, has very optimistic beliefs about what happens when an
economy is not burdened by laws such as NIRA: Public Policy Brief, No. 104 6
The model is intended to capture certain key effects of NIRA and
NLRA: a suspension of the antitrust laws that permitted collusion
in many industries (essentially cooperation among firms aimed at
maintaining high prices); and provisions that promoted collective
bargaining, which allegedly caused unemployment by raising wages
in some industries above competitive levels. Cole and Ohanian find
that “cartelization policies” account for about 60 percent of the gap
between actual and potential GDP (2004, 781). 
Models similar to Cole and Ohanian’s are now the norm in
mainstream academic macroeconomics, and they have short-
comings that cannot be addressed here. Lately, they have been
faulted by some economists for their apparent failure to forecast
and avert the current crisis (Buiter 2009; De Grauwe 2009). One
defect of this particular model is a lack of involuntary unem-
ployment. The “unemployed” workers in the model are merely
searching for jobs that pay more than positions in the competi-
tive sector, which are readily available—a scenario not corrobo-
rated by contemporary observers (Terkel 1970). This public
policy brief will not delve into the mathematics of the model,
which cannot be adequately addressed in a short publication
intended for a wide readership. Instead, the brief focuses on the
present-day implications of the cartelization hypothesis, the
applicability of Cole and Ohanian’s model to the Depression era,
and some aspects of the New Deal neglected by the critics. In
other words, the brief challenges a key historical claim of the
revisionists, one that is not necessarily tied to any particular
modeling methodology.
What Did NIRA and NLRA Do?
The cartelization hypothesis, as advanced by Cole and Ohanian,
depends on the claim that in the absence of NIRA and NLRA,
perfect competition would have prevailed in all markets, while
instead, these laws strengthened the monopoly power of firms
and resulted in an increase in the number of workers represented
by unions. Also, the article relies on the theory that these effects
could be expected to reduce economic growth. This section
addresses how well the critics’ story fits the political and institu-
tional facts of the period following the passage of NIRA. First, it
discusses the product-market aspects of NIRA, and then it deals
with the putative labor-market effects of NIRA and NLRA.
Readers may be surprised at the somewhat unflattering picture of
NIRA painted below, but acknowledging certain flaws in the law
and its execution will help show that it probably did not have the
The capitalistic economy is stable, and absent some change
in technology or the rules of the economic game, the econ-
omy converges to a constant growth path with the standard
of living doubling every 40 years. (Prescott 1999, 28)
The economists who have recently attempted to calculate the
effects of NIRA and NLRA use models that predict this kind of
consistent and rapid growth for an unregulated economy. NIRA
and other government programs, they say, constitute changes in
the rules of the economic game and are one reason why the econ-
omy’s performance fell short of their usual model’s predictions
during the recovery from the Depression (Prescott 1999, 28).
The academic articles cited in the introduction argue that
NIRA and/or NLRA impeded economic recovery in a number of
different ways. This public policy brief focuses on the cartelization
hypothesis, which is considered in academic work by Harold Cole
and Lee Ohanian (2004, 2009) and popularized in congressional
testimony and magazine articles by Ohanian (2009a, 2009b,
2009c). The term cartelization arises because economists often
think of the industry groups and unions formed under NIRA
and NLRA as cartels. (Some of the arguments below would apply
with equal force to other critiques of NIRA and NLRA.)
Cole and Ohanian begin by describing what they regard as
a subpar recovery after the economic collapse of 1929–33 (2004,
779–81). Despite some favorable “shocks” to the money supply,
productivity, and the banking system, real GDP per adult was
still 27 percent below trend in 1939. The total number of hours
clocked by U.S. workers was also well below trend as late as 1939.
Using a standard macroeconomic model, Cole and Ohanian find
that in the absence of some interference with the “competitive”
economic system, output and employment would have returned
to trend by the late 1930s. 
Some economists have taken exception to the claim that the
economy performed poorly following 1933. Friedman (2007) has
called into question Shlaes’s statements to this effect. Christina
Romer notes, “Between 1933 and 1937 real GNP in the United
States grew at an average rate of over 8 percent per year; between
1938 and 1941 it grew over 10 percent per year. These rates of
growth are spectacular, even for an economy pulling out of a
severe depression” (1992, 757). 
Cole and Ohanian do not agree, even leaving aside the severe
recession of 1937–38. Their paper is devoted to seeing whether a
model with cartels can account for the gap between actual growth
and employment and the predictions of their competitive model.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
negative effects described by its critics, nor did it hog-tie business
as Shlaes implies (2007, 151).
Many historians believe that NIRA indeed allowed “the large
corporations which dominated the code authorities [to use] their
powers to stifle competition, cut back production, and reap profits
from price-raising rather than business expansion” (Leuchtenberg
1963, 69).Cole and Ohanian measure the effects of NIRA versus
a baseline model with perfect competition. It is of course impos-
sible to ascertain the counterfactual of whether industry would
have been perfectly competitive in the relevant period if Roosevelt’s
legislation had not been signed into law. However, one way of mak-
ing some inferences about what would have happened is to com-
pare the 1930s with the 1920s. If monopoly power was already
widespread in the 1920s, it would be unlikely that perfect com-
petition would have existed in 1933–39 in the event that NIRA
and NLRA had not been passed. 
Indeed, some empirical studies at least raise the possibility
that there was no significant decrease in competition in the
1930s, compared to 1900–1930 (Stigler 1950, 46–59; Cox 1981,
181). As an example, in 1927, five years before Roosevelt’s elec-
tion, the U.S. Steel Corporation produced over 53 percent of the
total U.S. output of steel rails. Its mines and factories accounted
for more than 36 percent of the output of nine other major steel-
related products (Chandler 1990, 138). Throughout the 1920s,
large businesses, with the cooperation and help of the federal
government, were forming “trade associations,” which had the
effect of diminishing competition. There was 
a rapid burgeoning of trade associations, a rationale that
justified their anticompetitive activities, and a public policy
under which such agencies as the Department of Commerce
and the Federal Trade Commission helped these associa-
tions to standardize their products, expand their functions,
and formulate codes of proper practices, codes that generally
regarded a price cutter as a “chiseler” and price competition as
immoral. (Hawley 1966, 10; see also Himmelberg 1976)
With the onset of the Depression, cooperation among firms
began to break down amid pressure to cut prices. Also, antitrust
officials began to challenge many of the codes (Hawley 1966, 39).
Businesslooked to the government to help shore up their system
of collusion. The new NIRA codes were mostly initiated by existing
trade associations and were “largely a direct offshoot of the trade-
association system” (Bellush 1975, 44; see also, Himmelberg 1976).
Hence, NIRA cannot be seen as a government imposition of cartels
on a purely competitive system. This fact alone does not prejudice
Cole and Ohanian’s analysis of how the codes affected the econ-
omy, but it does mean that it is wrong to blame the codes and their
anticompetitive impact solely on the New Deal. 
In addition to the industrial cartels, Cole and Ohanian’s
model includes bargaining between industry and unions. This
aspect of the model is meant to represent the effects of NLRA
and section 7(a) of NIRA, both of which sought to establish
American workers’ rights to join unions and bargain collectively.
In essence, the paper uses the idea that unions act as “monopo-
lies” for workers, raising wages and causing unemployment.
They find that labor’s newfound bargaining power accounts for
a large portion of the negative effect of New Deal anticompeti-
tive legislation on GDP. One example is a scenario in which out-
put in the “cartel model” is 94 percent of output in a hypothetical
competitive economy, but this figure would rise to 97 percent if
labor’s negotiating power were reduced to zero (Cole and Ohanian
2004, 805).Along similar lines, historian Shlaes argues that exces-
sive wages and strikes brought on by New Deal legislation increased
unemployment (2007, 9). 
However, while the New Deal collective-bargaining laws
were a crucial step forward for the union movement in the
United States, their immediate effect was rather weak, largely
because the National Recovery Administration (NRA, the agency
charged with implementing the codes) had a probusiness bias
(Hawley 1966 ; Bellush 1975; Biles 1994, 83–102; Leuchtenberg
1963, 69–70). Less than 10 percent of the authorities that admin-
istered and enforced the codes had some labor representation
(Bellush 1975, 47). Paul Conkin reports, “Many corporations
evaded the labor codes (bargaining rights, wage-hour protection,
prevention of child labor) required by section 7(a) of NIRA, either
by establishing company unions or by deliberate refusals to rec-
ognize legitimate unions” (Conkin 1975, 33). Bellush’s account of
the effects of section 7(a) shows that business still had the upper
hand in the fight with organized labor (1975, 85–135). Labor
rights fell far short of the rules set forth in section 7(a), which
mandated that workers have the right to organize and bargain
collectively, “free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of
employers of labor” (Weinstein 1980, 19). 
Things did change somewhat in 1935 after the passage of
NLRA and the Supreme Court’s ruling that NIRA was unconsti-
tutional. Cole and Ohanian state that “union membership rose
from about 13 percent of employment in 1935 to about 29 percentPublic Policy Brief, No. 104 8
were even stronger in that decade than in the 1930s (2009a, 17). In
fact, an argument can be made that unions help create jobs in
nonunionized industries by enlarging the working-class market.
These facts put into context Shlaes’s statement that Roosevelt “sys-
tematized interest-group politics…, ministered to those groups
[including “labor” and “unionized workers”], and was rewarded
with votes” (2007, 11). More than Shlaes acknowledges, Roosevelt
and Robert Wagner, the Senate sponsor of NLRA, had the whole
country’s best interests at heart in their efforts to pass the bill. 
In sum, Cole and Ohanian base their assertions on results
from a careful and precise modeling exercise that says little about
the overall economic effects of NIRA and NLRA. Monopoly
power may have hurt consumers in the 1930s by raising prices
and reducing output, but NIRA cannot be blamed entirely for
cartels and monopolies that dated to the 1920s and earlier. NLRA
and section 7(a) of NIRA were major steps in the rise of the
union movement, but these laws probably had not made unions
strong enough in the early and mid 1930s to have much effect
on economic growth. Even if labor’s bargaining power was some-
what increased, it is important to avoid the impression that
Democratic “interest groups” such as labor were running ram-
pant in an economically counterproductive manner. Moreover,
while the “insider-outsider” labor-market models of the type
employed by Cole and Ohanian are certainly not intrinsically
worthless, such models cannot possibly offer a comprehensive
assessment of the costs and benefits of the prolabor legislation of
the New Deal. One would be needed to justify a conclusion that
NLRA and section 7(a) of NIRA reduced economic growth, let
alone that they were bad legislation.
What Is Left Out of the Cole and Ohanian Model?
Cole and Ohanian have included in their model one of the most
flawed, least effective, and weakly enforced pieces of New Deal
legislation, NIRA. The discussion above indicates that the codes
required by this law were not intended primarily to boost eco-
nomic growth. It seems fair to ask what would happen if Cole
and Ohanian’s model were modified to take into account all of
the major New Deal laws, or at least those thought of by liberal
economists as progrowth. It would be well-nigh impossible to
build such a model, but there are many reasons to think it would
show that the New Deal greatly improved growth in the 1930s
and even later. 
of employment in 1939” (2004, 785). Labor won some crucial
organizing victories soon after NLRA was signed into law in 1935
(Leuchtenberg 1963, 239–242). Conkin points out that the new
labor rights act proved far more effective than NIRA in provid-
ing protection for unions (1975, 62). Hence, Cole and Ohanian’s
assumption that union negotiating power was elevatedby the New
Deal is more plausible for the period from July 1935 to 1939 than
for 1933 to July 1935. Nevertheless, even after 1935, the union
movement advanced gradually and with strong opposition. As
Brad DeLong puts it, “NLRA came too late to be blamed for the
Great Depression. The most you can do is blame it for the 1937–
38 recession” (2009a, 17). The latter claim probably founders on
the much more logical explanation that fiscal policy tightened
sharply before that recession, a proposition that we intend to
flesh out in a future publication.  
Cole and Ohanian clearly do not pretend to engage in a
thorough evaluation of the social costs and benefits of unions.
Instead, they focus on the “monopoly” function of unions dur-
ing the 1930s. However, economists have studied many other
effects of unions, ranging from increased productivity in some
firms to industrial democracy to improved working conditions
for many nonunion workers (Freeman and Medoff 1984, 5).
Even some chairmen of large corporations have seen the union
tactics that disrupted the economy during the New Deal as part
of a beneficial movement, as evidenced by a quote from Thomas
Murphy of General Motors:
The UAW may have introduced the sit-down strike to
America, but in its relationship with GM management it has
also helped introduce…mutually beneficial cooperation….
What comes to my mind is the progress we have made, by
working together, in such directions as providing greater
safety and health protection, in decreasing alcoholism and
drug addiction, in improving the quality of work life.
(Quoted in Freeman and Medoff 1984, 4) 
In light of the many radical movements on the ascendancy
during the Depression, corporate leaders may have known that
widespread unionization also helped save capitalism. To the extent
that NLRA helped the unions organize more workplaces, it pro-
duced benefits not just for union members but for American busi-
ness and society. There were certainly costs, too, but these probably
did not include increased unemployment: DeLong points out that
unemployment was low in the 1950s, despite the fact that unionsThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
The authors of this brief intend to follow up with a publication
on the impact of the fiscal and job-creation policies introduced by
Roosevelt. Many historians and others have written about what
the New Deal accomplished (e.g., see Kennedy 1999, 363–380;
Rauchway 2008a). In the South, agricultural programs provided
money for the mechanization of agriculture, perhaps helping to
bring an end to the exploitative and inefficient sharecropping
system (Biles 1994, 56–57). New Deal public works programs
yielded not only paychecks but also national parks, roads,
bridges, and post offices—investments that no doubt yielded
large economic dividends (Leighninger 2007). Federal deposit
insurance all but eliminated old-fashioned bank runs, helping
financial institutions to perform more reliably their economi-
cally important functions. Social Security remains perhaps the
most popular federal program, helping many seniors avoid
poverty. The economic effects of the New Deal were vast and far-
reaching. A demonstration that NIRA and NLRA inhibited eco-
nomic recovery does not amount to an argument that the New
Deal slowed recovery or failed to increase output over the long
run (Rauchway 2008b, 2).
Some Other “Forgotten Men”?
The title of Shlaes’s book is The Forgotten Man. This phrase is
remembered in connection with the New Deal because of a
speech in which Roosevelt appealed to his audience on behalf of
“the forgotten man at the bottom of the economic pyramid”
(quoted in Shlaes 2007, 12). Shlaes sees her book in part as the
story of many other forgotten men. She traces the phrase back to
William Graham Sumner, a social scientist born in 1840, who
“warned that well-intentioned social progressives often coerced
unwitting average citizens into funding dubious social projects”
(12). Shlaes goes on to cite numerous examples of men appar-
ently forgotten in the New Deal era, ranging from “the fellow
that is trying to get along without public relief” to Andrew
Mellon, the wealthy banker who was Treasury Secretary under
three Republican administrations (13).
Since this public policy brief focuses on NIRA and NLRA, it
seems appropriate to ask who, if anyone, was forgotten in these
acts and their implementation. Shlaes takes up the case of Martin
Schechter and his family, the famous butchers who were prose-
cuted for violating NRA codes and ultimately prevailed in the
Supreme Court. More generally, she counts the consumer and
small businesses among those who were forgotten by the NRA
(Shlaes 2007, 226–27). One scholarly account argues that NIRA’s
representing “a triumph of big over small business is accurate
only in a limited and special sense” (Himmelberg 1976, 221).
Nonetheless, there is some merit to the claim that NIRA often
helped large corporations at the expense of the consumer and
small enterprises.  
On the other hand, Shlaes mentions many of the problems
experienced by African Americans during Roosevelt’s presidency,
but she does not point out that they suffered unfair treatment
under NIRA. In the drives to organize more workplaces follow-
ing the passage of NIRA, many unions excluded African
American workers, who were “rarely found in the ranks of organ-
ized labor during the early years of the New Deal” (Bellush 1975,
76–77). Many African Americans were forced out of skilled jobs
when the AFL organized their workplaces (81). Biles reports that
“NRA codes exempted from coverage agricultural laborers and
domestics, two categories that accounted for approximately three-
fourths of southern black workers” (1994, 111–12). Some codes
for mainly African American regions and occupations imposed
wages that were lower than pre-NIRA levels (Bellush 1975, 75–
81). The local compliance boards responsible for enforcing the
codes often ignored complaints by African Americans (Bellush
1975, 75–81; Biles 1994, 111). 
African American leaders and intellectuals spoke out strongly
against NIRA, which proved to be a setback in Roosevelt’s ulti-
mately successful effort to bring African American voters into the
Democratic party (Leuchtenberg 1963, 185–187). Once Roosevelt
declared before a Howard University audience in 1936 that there
would be “no forgotten men and no forgotten races” (quoted in
Shlaes 2007, 282), many officials, departments, and other programs
in the federal government contributed to a liberal presidential
record on race by the standards of the day (though NLRA, enacted
in 1935, replicated some of the inequities in NIRA). To mention
racial disparities in NRA codes is not to criticize The Forgotten Man,
but it helps round out Shlaes’s reckoning of the impact of early New
Deal legislation, not to mention our very favorable view of
Roosevelt’s “first 100 days.” Of course, African Americans were only
one of a number of groups treated unfairly by certain New Deal
programs and regulations. Moreover, these governmental initia-
tives were born of conflicts between different factions in Congress
and within Roosevelt’s administration, in a perilous era when social
attitudes were different from those of today.Public Policy Brief, No. 104 10
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Review, conclude “that the primary test for judging the value of
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plainly came up short” (2009, 25). This brief suggests that any
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through a desperate time and lay the basis for a quarter century
of relative prosperity following World War II. Business interests
who oppose a new New Deal would do well to remember that it
was not only labor that prospered: the inflation-adjusted, after-
tax profits of corporations rose 377 percent from 1935 to 1970.1
Like Roosevelt’s “first New Deal,” President Obama’s early
legislative achievements will not suffice to bring lasting prosper-
ity, especially to those who struggled to make ends meet even
before the current recession. As was true for Roosevelt, Obama’s
work has been made more challenging by the opposition of
probusiness lobbies, which may have to be accommodated to a
great extent once again. He still has a chance to stiffen financial
regulation, reform the health care system, safeguard labor rights,
and alleviate the effects of the recession, among other goals. The
New Deal can provide some of the inspiration needed for these
efforts. We hope that this brief helps to open the way for a real-
istic economic agenda, which will inevitably involve a new role
for government. 
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